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Power v. Arlington Hospital 1: A Federal Court 
End Run Around State Malpractice Limitations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When asked about escalating health care costs, President 
George Bush responded: 
She asked the question, I think, is whether - if [the] 
health care profession was to blame, no. One thing to blame 
is these malpractice lawsuits, they're breaking the system. It 
costs twenty to twenty-five billion dollars a year and I want 
to see those outrageous claims capped.2 
The increasing costs of medical treatment and the lack of 
access of some of the population to adequate medical care have 
captured the mind of the public. Despite the current rhetoric, 
steps have been taken on both the federal and state level to 
help improve the medical system. 
Many states have enacted medical malpractice award limi-
tations or personal injury damages award limitations.3 These 
1. 800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
2. President George Bush, Presidential Debate, October 15, 1992, CNN Tran-
scripts. 
3. The following twenty-two stales have enacted statutory caps on awards: 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (1992) ($500,000 limit for noneconomic damages in per-
sonal injury actions, not including disfigurement or severe physical impairment); 
CAL. Crv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1993) ($250,000 limit for noneconomic damages in 
medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1992) ($250,000 limit 
for noneconomic damages generally, $500,000 limit for noneconomic damages where 
there is clear and convincing evidence which justifies such a fmding by the court); 
IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (1992) ($400,000 limit for noneconomic damages in personal 
injury action); 735 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (no 
punative damages allowed in medical malpractice cases); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-
2-2 (Burns 1992) ($750,000 limit on all damages recoverable for injuries in a medi-
cal malpractice action); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-340 (1986) ($250,000 limit on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1299.39.F (West 1992) ($500,000 limit on all damages except medical ex-
penses); MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 11-108 (1992) ($350,000 limit on 
noneconomic damages in any action for personal injury); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 231, § 60H (West 1992) ($500,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice actions, not including wrongful death actions); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.1583 (1986) ($225,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon 1992) ($350,000 limit for noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1992) 
($1,250,000 limit on all damages in medical malpractice cases); N.H. REV. STAT. 
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statutes are designed in part to reduce the cost and increase 
the availability of malpractice insurance for doctors.4 The low-
er costs for doctors are to be passed on to the consumer in the 
form of lower medical bills and lower costs for health insur-
ance. 
While states were attacking the medical crisis by limiting 
damages, Congress was approaching the crisis from another 
direction. Congress was taking action to force hospitals to pro-
vide care for those who could not afford it. Congress passed the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA) to force Medicare-participating hospitals to treat 
indigent patients, thereby producing better care for those who 
cannot afford to pay for treatment.5 
In theory, these two separate approaches should act to-
gether to improve the health care system in the United States. 
However, EMTALA and the state statutes have come into con-
flict with each other. The United States District Court for Vir-
ANN. § 508:4-d (1986) ($875,000 limit on noneconomic damages for personal injury 
cases); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1992) ($500,000 limit on punitive 
damages in medical malpractice action); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1992) ($500,00 
limit on damages arising from bodily injury); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 
(1992) ($1,000,000 limit for all damages in medical malpractice cases); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1987) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical mal-
practice cases); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1992) ($1,000,000 limit for all 
damages in medical malpractice cases); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1992) ($1,000,000 
for noneconomic loss in medical malpractice cases); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) 
(West 1992) ($1,000,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
cases); WYO. STAT. § 1-4-101 (1992) (damages for personal injury limited to that 
recoverable under the wrongful death act). 
In addition to those states above, the following three states previously had 
caps: HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 663-8.5, -8.7 (1991) ($375,000 limit for pain and suffer-
ing, distinguished from other noneconomic damages of mental anguish, disfigure-
ment, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, and other pecuniary losses or 
claims) (legislation repealed effective Oct. 1, 1993); MINN. STAT. § 549.2:1 (1993) 
($400,000 limit on embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium) (leg-
islation repealed effective May, 4 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 
1992) ($1,000,000 variable cap on noneconomic damages for personal injury cases) 
(legislation declared unconstitutional in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 
(Wash. 1989)). Cf Thomas R. Ruge, Medical Malpractice, 22 IND. L. REV. 535, 549 
n.75 (1989) (listing nineteen states as having enacted statutory caps on awards). 
4. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING THE LIABILITY 
INSURANCE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM TO THE GoVERNOR AND THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF 1987, S. Doc. No. 11 at 12-13 (1987), discussed 
in Sandra J. Morris, Comment, Will Tort Reform Combat the Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Availability and A{fordability Problems That Virginia's Physicians Are 
Facing?, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463, 1463 nn.1-3 (1987). 
5. EMTALA was passed as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act (COBRA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988) (effective August 1, 1986)). 
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ginia recently ruled on a motion to apply a state medical mal-
practice damages award cap to an EMTALA claim in Power v. 
Arlington Hospital. 6 The defendants wanted the limits to apply 
to the action, thereby limiting the potential damages they 
would have to pay. The court held that the state malpractice 
cap did not apply to the EMTALA action, effectively circum-
venting the state malpractice damage limitations. 7 The Power 
court is apparently the first court in an EMTALA action to 
allow a plaintiff to recover more than the state malpractice 
damage caps. 
This note will explore the conflicts between EMTALA and 
the state statute involved in Power and the issues involved in 
applying EMTALA in jurisdictions with medical malpractice 
award damages caps. Section II will give background informa-
tion about medical malpractice limitations and EMTALA. Sec-
tion III will provide a factual summary of the case. Section IV 
will cover the court's reasoning. Section V will analyze the 
decision in light of other developments in the judiciary's inter-
pretation of EMTALA. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Medical Malpractice Legislation 
In 1992, the estimated $800 billion in health care spent in 
the United States accounted for 14% of the Gross National 
Product; in contrast, only 5.9% of the GNP was spent on health 
care in 1965.8 High medical malpractice awards are blamed by 
some for the current medical cost boom. 9 
One of every five physicians is subject to a medical mal-
practice suit each year. 10 A recent Harvard study found that 
although 80% of all medical malpractice suits filed show no 
evidence of malpractice, fifteen of every sixteen persons actual-
6. 800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
7. !d. at 1397-98. 
8. Pete V. Domenici, Yes: A Prime Factor. (Health Care Reform: Should Curb-
tn~ Medical Malpractice Litigation Be Part of the Solution?), A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, 
at 42 [hereinafter Domenici]. 
9. !d. 
10. Malpractice Suits: Doctors Under Siege, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 62. 
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ly injured due to a doctor's negligence are never 
compensated. 11 
In 1985, physicians' malpractice premiums were 2% of all 
property and casualty premiums written, but accounted for 5% 
of all underwriting losses. 12 Because of the losses, insurance 
companies suffered. They began restricting insurance avail-
ability, thereby making it difficult for health care providers to 
get insurance. 13 
Some states reacted to this problem by enacting statutes 
designed to reform the malpractice tort system. Many states 
enacted statutes that limit medical malpractice damages. 14 
The effectiveness of these statutes is currently an issue of de-
bate. 15 Virginia enacted a statute that both established a re-
view board to screen malpractice claims before they were 
brought before the court16 and limited the amount of punitive 
damages that could be awarded in a malpractice case. 17 
11. Domenici, supra note 7, at 42. 
12. Malpractice Suits: Doctors Under Siege, supra note 10, at 62. 
13. See, e.g., Sandra J. Morris, Comment, Will Tort Reform Combat the Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Availability and Affordability Problems That Virginia's Physi-
cians are Facing?, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1463, 1463 nn.2-3 (1987) (discussing 
problems of Virginia physicians trying to obtaining insurance). 
14. See supra note 2. Eleven states which have enacted statutes specifically 
designed to limit malpractice awards: California, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
The statutes and section numbers are listed in note 2. 
15. Full discussion of the effectiveness of tort reform legislation, and the debate 
that rages concerning tort reform, is beyond the scope of this article. See Margaret 
Cronin Fisk, Reform Measures Made Little Impact, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 33 
(discussing Indiana malpractice caps which reduced the insurance premium for 
doctors but increased malpractice award amounts); Pete V. Domenici & William W. 
Falsgraf, Health Care Reform: Should Curbing Medical Malpractice Litigation be 
Part of the Solution?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992 at 42-43 (Mr. Domenici writing in favor 
of curbing medical malpractice litigation and Mr. Falsgraf writing against limita-
tions). 
16. "The claimant or health care provider may within sixty days of [notification 
of a malpractice action] file a written request for a review by a medical malprac-
tice review panel established as provided in § H.01-581.3." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
581.2 (1992). 
17. The Virginia malpractice limitation statutes states: 
In any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for 
malpractice where the act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after 
October 1, 1983, which is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered 
against a health care provider in such an action which is tried without a 
jury, the total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a patient 
shall not exceed one million dollars. 
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In 1987, it was estimated that annually 250,000 emergency 
patients were transferred or discharged from health care facili-
ties because of inability to pay for medical services.18 The 
practice came to be known as "patient dumping" and caused 
significant increases in complications and mortality among the 
transferred patients. 19 In 1986, as part of the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), Congress enact-
ed EMTALA.20 
EMTALA requires hospitals participating in Medicare to 
fulfill two obligations to patients entering the emergency room. 
First, the hospital must provide "an appropriate medical 
screening examination"21 to determine whether or not an 
"emergency medical condition"22 exists. Second, the hospital 
may not transfer an individual with an emergency medical 
condition until that condition has been stabilized.23 
18. Christine A. Fedas, Emergency Treatment Act: A Federal Response to Patient 
Dumping, 76 MASS. L. REV. 110 (1991) (citing Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping: 
Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500 (March 20, 
1987)). 
19. Ansell & Schiff, supra note 18, at 1500-01. 
20. See supra note 4. The act was amended in 1989, to make the act applicable 
to more transfers, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. 
L. No. 101-239, § 6211 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (Supp. 1990) 
(effective July 1, 1990)). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988). 
22. Section 1395dd states: 
The term "emergency medical condition" means - (A) a medical condition 
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including se-
vere pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could 
result in - (i) placing the health of the individual in serious jeopardy, 
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of 
any bodily organ or part . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (1988). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) (1988). "The term 'stabilized' means, with respect to 
an emergency medical condition described in paragraph (l)(A), that no material 
deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to 
result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility ... ." 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). 
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The legislative history of the Act indicates that the intent 
of the legislation was to respond to the "dumping" of indigent 
patients who had no insurance.24 The Act applies to any Medi-
care-participating institution25 that has a "hospital emergency 
department."26 The Act explicitly refuses to "preempt any 
state or local law requirement, except to the extent that the 
requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of 
[EMTALA]."27 
2. Enforcement provisions 
The statute creates a federal private cause of action to 
enforce the hospital obligations outlined above. The relevant 
section reads as follows: 
(2) Civil Enforcement. (A) Personal Harm. Any individual who 
suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating 
hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a 
civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those 
damages available for personal injury under the law of the 
State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable 
relief as is appropriate.28 
3. Court interpretations 
Consensus regarding the meaning of the terms of EMTALA 
has not been reached. Some courts have construed EMTALA to 
include the substantive provisions of state law, but not the 
procedural or jurisdictional limitations.29 Some courts have 
interpreted EMTALA to extend not just to indigent patients, 
but to anyone who seeks care in a Medicare-participating emer-
gency room. 30 
24. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 605-06; Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 
1269, 1271-72 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (outlining reasons for enactment and providing 
further documentation). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(O. 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(2)(A). 
29. Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855-56 
(S.D. Ind. 1989). 
30. See Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990); Deberry 
v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990). But see Evit v. Uni-
versity Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 
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The legislative history of the Act indicates a concern for 
indigent patients. Since the Act does not explicitly require 
indigency, however, some courts apply the Act to all persons 
entering the emergency room.31 The statute itself states, "[i]n 
the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency depart-
ment, if any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits 
under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department ... 
the hospital must provide for an appropriate screening exami-
nation."32 The lack of explicit congressional guidance allows 
the judiciary to establish its own, often conflicting, standards. 
Ill. FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Factual Summary 
Susan Power, a British citizen living in the United States, 
arrived at Arlington Hospital's emergency room at approxi-
mately 5:45 a.m. on February 24, 1990.33 She was unable to 
walk, and complained of hip pain.34 Upon admittance her vital 
signs were taken, an x-ray of her hip was taken, a preliminary 
urinalysis was done, and a more thorough urinalysis was or-
dered.35 Shortly after her arrival, the hospital learned that 
Ms. Powers was uninsured and unemployed. 36 
When she arrived, Ms. Power was examined by the doctor 
on duty and the doctor from the ensuing shift. Neither doctor 
reached any definite diagnosis.37 Before the urinalysis results 
became available, the doctor gave her a pain prescription, told 
her to return if her condition worsened, and discharged her 
from the hospitaJ.38 
F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990). 
31. "Obviously we will not allow a few references to the statute's purpose [i.e., 
protecting indigent patients] in the legislative history to override the plain meaning 
of its terms as enacted." Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (emphasis added). Chapter 7 is Social Security. 
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Ms. Power returned to the emergency room the following 
day and was immediately admitted. 39 She was diagnosed as 
having septic shock.40 She remained hospitalized for four 
months. Because of her condition she lost sight in one of her 
eyes and had both legs amputated below the kneeY At the 
end of the four months, Ms. Power was transferred to Central 
Middlesex Hospital in Britain.42 
B. Procedural History 
Ms. Power filed a four-count, $180 million action in federal 
court against the hospital, a physician, and a physicians' group. 
Two of the counts were EMTALA claims. The first EMTALA 
claim alleged patient dumping based on the failure to provide 
an appropriate screening examination during her first visit to 
the emergency room. 43 The second claim was based on Ms. 
Power's transfer to the British hospital. 44 
The court dismissed claims against the physicians and the 
physicians' group because the Act authorizes action only 
against "participating hospitals."45 The hospital sought and 
was denied summary judgment. Prior to the trial, the parties 
filed cross motions in limine to resolve the question of whether 
damages were limited by the Virginia medical malpractice 
damages cap.46 
Ms. Power's third claim, a state tort law cause of action 
based on the amputations, was dismissed by the court without 
prejudice. Dismissal was on the grounds that the tort claim wo-
uld have to be subjected to the Virginia Malpractice Act, re-
quiring a medical malpractice review process, before it could be 
39. ld. 
40. Septic shock is a condition in which there is tissue damage and a dramatic 
drop in blood pressure as a result of the multiplication of bacteria and the pres-
ence of their toxins in the blood. Septic shock may cause tissue damage and pro-
hibit the circulation of blood. It requires immediate treatment, including use of 
antibiotics and sometimes surgery. "Despite treatment, septic shock remains a 
grave condition; survival rates are no better than 50 percent." THE AMERICAN MED-
ICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 895 (Charles B. Clayman ed., 1989). 
41. 800 F. Supp. at 1386. 
42. ld. 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c). This is a dispute over whether the transfer was 
properly performed according to the requirements outlined in section (c) of the 
statute. 
45. 42 u.s.c. § 1395dd. 
46. 800 F. Supp. at 1387. 
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heard by the court. 4 7 
IV. REASONING 
The court framed the main issue as "whether the phrase 
'those damages available for personal injury under the law of 
the state' encompasses or excludes Virginia's medical malprac-
tice damages cap."48 The court began with the language of the 
statute itself. 
The court interpreted the language of the statute, "person-
al injury," as meaning state personal injury damages, not dam-
ages under medical malpractice.49 The Virginia personal inju-
ry laws contain no dollar limit on damages that can be award-
ed.50 The court also found no language in EMTALA limiting 
"personal injury" damages to malpractice damages.51 It there-
fore concluded that EMTALA damages in Virginia were not 
limited by a dollar amount. 52 
The court found support for its conclusion by reviewing the 
differing statutory purposes underlying the EMTALA provi-
sions and the Virginia malpractice cap. According to the court, 
EMTALA was enacted to deter hospitals from, and compensate 
victims of, "patient dumping." The Virginia malpractice cap 
was enacted not to deter nor to compensate, but rather "to 
combat medical malpractice insurance availability and 
affordability problems plaguing Virginia's health care provid-
ers."53 "Th[e] sharp difference in statutory purposes militates 
firmly against engrafting Virginia's malpractice damages cap 
onto EMTALA, particularly where, as here, EMTALA's plain 
language does not invite it."54 
The court then addressed and declined to follow two cases 
47. !d.; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2. (1992). 
48. 800 F. Supp. at 1388. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. 
51. "The provision merely refers to 'damages available for personal injury;' it 
does not say 'damages available for personal injury except as may be limited in 
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which had reached the opposite result, holding that medical 
malpractice damage caps did apply to EMTALA.55 
A. Reid 
In the first case, Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical 
Hospital,56 the court held that Congress intended to incorpo-
rate the states' malpractice damages cap on EMTALA claims. 
The Reid court based its findings on both legislative history 
and the incorporation clause in EMTALA. 
In Reid, the court found the history of EMTALA silent on 
the issue of whether or not state malpractice caps were to be 
included or excluded. 57 Because Congress knew of the growing 
concern about the large monetary amounts of malpractice dam-
ages awards and that states were enacting malpractice caps, 
the court concluded that Congress wanted to incorporate the 
state limits into the EMTALA.58 The Reid court found no evi-
dence of states limiting personal injury damages outside of 
medical malpractice limitations and concluded that reading 
EMTALA to exclude malpractice caps would make the incorpo-
ration clause "effectively meaningless."59 
The Power court found the assumptions of the Reid court 
to be inconsistent with the legislative history and plain lan-
guage of the statute. The court held that a malpractice cap was 
at odds with EMTALA's deterrence purpose, reasoning that if 
the caps were placed too low the deterrence goals of EMTALA 
would be defeated.60 The Power court concluded by stating 
that the findings of the Reid court were flawed because they ig-
nored: 
(i) that the statutory phrase "damages available for personal 
injury" has a well-understood generic meaning that is differ-
ent from "damages available for malpractice claims;" (ii) that 
state malpractice actions are separate and distinct from 
EMTALA actions, each focusing on different conduct and each 
seeking to achieve different goals; and (iii) that in light of (i) 
and (ii), there is no good reason to engraft state malpractice 
55. Lee by Wetzel v. Allegheny Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. 
Va. 1991); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. 
Ind. 1989). 
56. 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989). 
57. ld. at 855. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. 
60. Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1390. 
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damages caps onto EMTALA private actions. 61 
B. Lee 
The second case, Lee by Wetzel v. Allegheny Regional Hos-
pital Corp.,62 followed Reid in applying the malpractice dam-
ages cap to an EMTALA cause of action. The Lee court found 
no states that limited all personal injury damages. 63 In accor-
dance with Reid, the court found that interpreting EMTALA to 
exclude medical malpractice damages caps would render the 
incorporation clause meaningless.64 It also found that "it is a 
fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute 
should not be constructed in a manner which renders certain 
provisions meaningless or insignificant."65 
The Power court cited Lee as "unpersuasive" because it 
followed Reid without any additional reasoning. The Power 
court also listed eight states that had enacted personal injury 
damage caps outside of the medical malpractice realm.66 
The court concluded its analysis with a number of cases 
holding that EMTALA cases do not need to be brought before a 
state medical malpractice board.67 The "procedural obstacle" of 
61. !d. 
62. 77R F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
68. !d. at 904. 
64. !d. 
65. !d., citing Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 970-
71 (5th Cir. 1981). 
66. Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1390 n.16. The states and limits listed by the court 
are as follows: ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (1986) (noneconomic damages for personal 
injury may not exceed $500,000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1991) 
(noneconomic damages for "any civil action" shall not exceed $500,000); IDAHO 
CODE § 6-1603 (1991) (noneconomic damages for personal injury shall not exceed 
$400,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a0l.(b) (1990) (total amount of damages in any 
personal injury action shall not exceed the sum total of $250,000); MD. CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 11-108 (1989 Rep!. Vol.) (noneconomic damages in personal injury action limited 
to $350,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1978) (limitation of $500,000 per 
occurrence in any action); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1989) (damages arising out 
of bodily injury may not exceed $500,000); WYO. STAT. § 1-4-101 (1977) (damages 
for personal injury limited to that recoverable under the wrongful death act). 
67. Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 442 (1992); Toliver v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., CA. No. 90-0501-A, slip 
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the board review was seen as being "directly at odds with the 
purpose and structure of the EMTALA.'168 The cases were ap-
plied by analogy to the case at bar, reasoning that unless re-
moved, the malpractice caps might frustrate EMTALA goals to 
deter patient dumping. Therefore, the caps must be removed 
just as the other "obstacles" to EMTALA had been removed 
because they frustrated the purpose of the act.69 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Issues Power Ignored 
In its criticism of the Reid case, the Power court argued 
that the medical malpractice award damage caps were incon-
sistent with EMTALA's purpose. The court stated that low 
limits on damages would reduce the statute's deterrent effect. 
However, the court failed to consider several relevant issues. 
The court listed typical damage cap amounts that it con-
sidered to be at odds with EMTALA's goals, "$1,000 or even 
$10,000."70 These amounts are significantly lower than the $1 
million limit in the state. Yet the court never addresses the 
issue of whether a $1 million award limit is at odds with 
EMTALA's goal. 
The court presented evidence which implied that the Vir-
ginia standard did not obstruct EMTALA goals when it listed 
personal injury limitations enacted by other states. The court 
listed the limitations to refute the Reid court's assertion that 
states do not have limitations on personal injury outside of 
malpractice limits.71 These state personal injury limitations, 
however, were all below the $1 million Virginia limit. 72 The 
lowest state personal injury limit was only $250,000, far below 
the Virginia malpractice limits. 73 Given the fact that the court 
found the state personal injury limitations consistent with the 
goals of EMTALA, the court should not have been concerned 
that Virginia malpractice limits were too low and would there-
op. (E.D. Va. Aug 30, 1991). 
68. 800 F. Supp. at 1391. 
69. ld.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(0 (allowing for the removal of conflicting state and 
local requirements). 
70. 800 F. Supp. at 1390. 
71. ld. 
72. See supra note 64 for statute malpractice cap amounts. 
73. ld. The state mentioned by the court with the lowest limit is Kansas. The 
Kansas limit is $250,000 on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a01(b) (1990). 
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fore obstruct the purpose of EMTALA. 
The court further stated that if a court found dollar 
amounts of personal injury limitations so low that they frus-
trated EMTALA's purposes, such as the $1,000 or $10,000 lim-
its mentioned earlier, the caps would probably be struck down 
because they blocked attainment of EMTALA's goals.74 The 
court did not address why courts could not apply the same 
remedy if malpractice caps were excessively low. If the court 
could strike down any excessively low malpractice limit that 
hindered EMTALA, the court would also need to rule on wheth-
er the $1 million limit was in direct conflict with EMTALA. 
The Power court failed to make such finding. Blanket invalida-
tion of all malpractice damage limitations was unjustified, 
given the court's ability to invalidate offending statutes. 
While the court couched its arguments in terms of objec-
tions to the application of the medical malpractice caps to 
EMTALA, it actually presents problems that may arise if any 
limit on damages is so low that it prevents proper enforcement 
of the EMTALA. The court never addresses exactly where the 
threshold amount lies. Nevertheless, the court does make it 
clear that if a limit is too low, courts have tools to effectively 
deal with the problem. 
B. Purposes for Enactment 
Mter addressing the effect of malpractice limitations on 
EMTALA's goals, the court discussed the reasons for enactment 
of the statutes as another grounds for not applying the mal-
practice limits to EMTALA claims. The court pointed to the 
difference between the purposes for which the two statutes 
were created. Although the purposes were different, they seem 
to overlap in more areas than the court would have us believe. 
1. EMTALA actions are usually malpractice cases 
EMTALA causes of action arise out of what is normally a 
medical malpractice situation. If a doctor transfers a patient 
who should not have been transferred and the patient is in-
74. 800 F. Supp. at 1390. 
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jured, she can probably file a malpractice action and an 
EMTALA action.75 The overlap in the cause of action gives 
some indication that the two statutes are related. Moreover, an 
analysis of personal injury and medical malpractice causes of 
action provides further evidence of how EMTALA and the mal-
practice damages are related. 
2. Every malpractice claim is a personal injury 
In Maziarka v. St. Elizabeth Hospital,76 the plaintiff sued 
for punitive damages under an EMTALA cause of action. Under 
Illinois law punitive damages were not available in malpractice 
actions.77 The plaintiff asked the court to award punitive dam-
ages under EMTALA. The court refused to grant punitive dam-
ages on the grounds that "the only claim plaintiff could have 
against defendants under the law of Illinois is for medical mal-
practice which is barred by Illinois statute."78 
The Maziarka court viewed medical malpractice as a sub-
division of personal injury law. 79 Under this view, every medi-
cal malpractice claim is a personal injury claim (although the 
opposite is not true: every personal injury claim is not a medi-
cal malpractice claim). If medical malpractice is viewed as a 
specific type of personal injury claim, it would appear that 
Congress must have intended the medical malpractice limits to 
apply to EMTALA causes of action. 
3. Does EMTALA limit malpractice cap effectiveness 
The Power court was obligated to overrule the state limits 
if they directly conflicted with EMTALA, so the court only 
considered the problem from the view point of why EMTALA 
was drafted and whether or not the malpractice cap hindered 
the goal of EMTALA. However, in gaining a full understanding 
of the effect of the decision it is important to also consider why 
the malpractice statute was enacted, and whether excluding 
EMTALA actions from the cap limits its effectiveness. 
75. !d. at 1389 n.15. 
76. No. 88 C 665, 1989 WL 13195 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1989). 
77. !d. at 2, citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 2-1115 (1988). 
78. !d. This is a case where the Power court might find the state law to pre-
vent the goals of the EMTALA from being achieved and would consider the use of 
judicial tools to provide remedy. However, this statute only bars recovery of puni-
tive damages, not personal injury damages, which is what EMTALA provides. 
79. Maziarka, No. 88 C 6658, 1989 WL 13195 at 2. 
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It is important to note that many courts, including the 
Power court, have interpreted EMTALA to apply to any patient 
in a Medicare-participating emergency department.8° Com-
mentators have suggested that EMTALA be re-written to spe-
cifically include only indigent patients to comply with the 
statute's original rationale.81 Nevertheless, until a resolution 
of the problem is found, many courts will continue to construe 
EMTALA to cover all individuals. 
The broad application of EMTALA to all individuals cre-
ates a large potential source of litigation. 82 Each of these caus-
es of action could result in damage amounts far in excess of the 
malpractice caps. Because EMTALA cases are also malpractice 
cases, allowing this large group to circumvent the malpractice 
damage caps could frustrate the cost-controlling purpose of 
award caps. Hospitals may again face great difficulties in ob-
taining insurance. While courts are able to remedy potential 
problems that arise if caps are allowed under EMTALA, the 
courts lack the tools available to correct problems created by 
EMTALA claims not limited by malpractice caps. 
C. Suggested Solution 
The best solution is to allow the medical malpractice limi-
tations to apply to EMTALA claims. This allows the purposes 
of both statutes to be carried out. Malpractice awards will be 
limited, allowing better availability of insurance and therefore 
better health care, and patient dumping will be deterred by the 
threat of EMTALA actions. 
It appears likely that if the courts do not fix this problem 
80. Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1388 n.8; Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp. 947 F.2d 
412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990). 
81. Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The EITU'.rgency Treatment & Active Labor 
Act: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (1992) (citing cases which have limited EMTALA to 
indigent patients only and cases that have allowed all claimants and arguing that 
the plain language of the statute be amended to reflect the legislative history and 
limit EMTALA causes of action to indigent patients). 
82. See supra note 18 and accompanying terl. The estimated cases were only 
from indigent patients; no statistics were available on patient dumping for reasons 
other than indigency. 
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the state legislatures or Congress may be forced to act. The 
state legislatures may limit personal injury award amounts; 
but states may not want to limit those damages. Congress 
could explicitly state that EMTALA only applies to indigent 
patients, which may limit the impact on the availability of 
insurance for hospitals; or Congress could expressly include the 
malpractice limitations imposed by states. 
Unfortunately, the states are left with the fewest alterna-
tives and the most potential problems. It is a logical judicial 
decision, within congressional intent, to apply state malpractice 
limitations so that the reduced damages do not hamper 
EMTALA's deterrent effect. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Power court's decision to allow EMTALA cases_ to fall 
outside the medical malpractice damages awards cap could 
have serious negative effects on state legislative efforts to deal 
with the current nationwide medical crisis. Permitting 
EMTALA cases to circumvent state medical malpractice dam-
ages caps significantly limits the effectiveness of the damages 
caps, especially in light of the court's broad application 
EMTALA to all patients, regardless of economic stature. 
EMTALA allows for preemption of state law only where 
the law directly conflicts with EMTALA. The Power court could 
not demonstrate that the state malpractice damages cap di-
rectly conflicted with EMTALA. The court referred to damages 
amount caps so low that they would conflict. However, those 
amounts were significantly lower than those of the state. The 
court also failed to show that application of the state limits 
would prevent the accomplishment of the goals of EMTALA. 
Conversely, allowing the cap to apply to EMTALA cases 
would not limit the effectiveness of EMTALA's goal of prevent-
ing "patient dumping" and would further the state goals in 
enacting the malpractice damages cap. The decision of the 
court unnecessarily allows emergency patients to do an end-run 
around the state limits and defeats the state legislatures' pur-
pose for enacting the statute. 
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